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As prominent representatives of German critical theory, Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth are at
the center of many debates in contemporary political theory. Outside of expert circles of critical
theory,  however,  their  most  prominent  writings  are  often discussed in isolation  from the larger
theoretical questions that animate their work. It is therefore fortunate that two new introductions
aim to present systematic evaluations of their works and to reconstruct their central ideas.
The central idea of Baynes’s Habermas is “Kantian pragmatism”, i.e. the view “that human
knowledge […] is structured by our cognitive faculties and rooted in (more or less stable) social
practices” (222). In other words, it is a socialized version of Kantianism that one may equally well
call “Hegelian”. Kantian pragmatism is taken to be an answer to the question of how to make sense
of human rationality in the light of the insights of the natural sciences – namely, as both the capacity
to participate in practices of communication and that which grounds the social status of interlocutor
in these practices. In the philosophy of the human sciences, Kantian pragmatism allows Habermas
to defend the necessity of the participant perspective and the “manifest image” of the person against
naturalist reductionism. In moral philosophy, it allows him to adopt a constructivist interpretation of
moral  discourse  that  makes  possible  the  integration  of  contextual  insights.  In  political  theory,
Kantian pragmatism allows for the grounding of legal authority in the presuppositions of political
self-determination.
Baynes’s  rich  and  competent  reconstruction  of  Habermas’s  work  deserves  much  more
commentary than this review allows. Regarding the themes mentioned thus far, he not only provides
a clear summary of Habermas’s position but also discusses the most important objections raised
against it and contrasts it with the views of other contemporary authors. This strategy of presenting
Habermas’s position as part of a larger dialogue is especially pronounced with regards to three
topics. In chapter four, he systematically compares Habermas’s “Kantian pragmatism” with Robert
Brandom’s “normative pragmatism”. In chapter five, he discusses Habermas’s discourse ethics in
comparison with Thomas Scanlon’s metaethical theory. And finally, since Habermas developed his
legal and political theory (discussion of which makes up approximately one-third of Baynes’s book
in chapters six and seven) in explicit dialogue with various authors in the liberal tradition, this topic
also naturally lends itself to this form of presentation.
Two features of this strategy warrant closer attention. First, Baynes uses objections as an
opportunity to develop an interpretation of Habermas’s claims that can withstand their critique. We
can thus read his book as a defense of Habermas rather than a mere summary. Baynes provides what
he takes to be the most reasonable reformulation of Habermas’s basic ideas. Even Habermas experts
(and especially Habermas skeptics) will learn much from considering these reformulations.
Second,  as  mentioned above,  Baynes’s  exposition of  Habermas’s  central  ideas  takes  the
form of a dialogue with other contemporary, mostly liberal, philosophers. This is extremely helpful
for clarifying what is at stake in these debates and for showing why people working in ethics (or
liberal political theory) should engage with Habermas. It underlines the significance of Habermas’s
theory even for  philosophers  who do not  buy into the Frankfurt  School  project  or  Habermas’s
broader  social  theory.  Since  many  representatives  of  contemporary  liberal  philosophy  scarcely
engage with issues of social theory, this decision leads Baynes to focus on Habermas’s work after
TCA, to which approximately two-thirds of the book is dedicated. Habermas’s earlier, more socio-
theoretic writings are treated less as a subject of ongoing debate and more as historical background. 
Baynes’s introduction presupposes knowledge about the relevant debates and is therefore
perhaps better suited to graduate students and professional scholars. Zurn’s Axel Honneth is more
self-contained and thus also more accessible to the philosophical novice. Like Baynes, Zurn focuses
on  a  central  idea  rather  than  reconstructing  Honneth’s  theory  from  the  perspective  of  central
controversies  in  continental  social  philosophy (which  is  Jean-Philippe  Deranty’s  strategy in  his
excellent Beyond Communication). Central to Zurn’s Honneth is the idea that human beings depend
on various forms of recognition and that this need for recognition is both a fundamental component
of social integration and the driving force of social change. Accordingly, roughly the first half of the
book is  devoted  to  outlining  the  individual-psychological  and social  dimensions  of  recognition
theory.  The second half  discusses  Honneth’s  concept  of  social  pathologies,  the  Honneth-Fraser
debate about recognition and markets, and the development of Honneth’s theories in  Freedom’s
Right. Zurn’s discussion of these topics is informed by a wide range of sources and covers the main
objections that scholars have raised against Honneth’s account. The core of recognition theory, on
his account, is an anthropological thesis about the importance of recognition, even though particular
forms of recognition are taken to be a subject of historical change and social and political struggles.
The three dimensions of love, respect and esteem will be familiar to any Honneth reader. However,
Honneth leaves  open how to integrate  the idea of “fundamental  recognition” (developed in his
Reification book) into his overall theory. Zurn argues that we should see it as a fourth dimension of
recognition that provides something like a transcendental condition for the other forms. The debate
between Honneth and Fraser is interpreted as being partly about the empirical question of the extent
to which norms of esteem really drive (potentially conflictual) social developments and partly about
the  universality  of  the  norms that  derive  from these  anthropological  assumptions.  The  idea  of
“social pathologies” is ultimately taken to be a methodological tool that is relatively independent of
more substantial theoretical claims.
Generally speaking, Zurn reads Honneth as providing an anthropologically informed basis
for a liberal ethics. To be sure, Zurn is careful to avoid the misunderstanding that recognition theory
is only about contemporary “identity politics” and emphasizes that Honneth develops this theory
based in part on insights into the moral character of workers’ struggles. He reads recognition theory
as a broad answer to questions of justice in general – from this perspective, it is not surprising that
Zurn  returns  repeatedly  to  issues  like  multiculturalism  and  LGBTQ  struggles  to  illustrate  the
importance of recognition, issues that (perhaps regrettably) occupy a relatively marginal space in
Honneth’s theory. This is perhaps because these struggles are more at the center of public debate at
the moment (compared with working class resistance). However, Zurn's reading also makes clear
that even on this wider interpretation,  “recognition” is mainly understood as a general term for
socially  shared  structures  of  normative  valuation,  independently  of  its  application  to  specific
political questions.
It is perhaps worthwhile to examine how Baynes and Zurn address a cluster of challenges
inevitably faced by introductions to versions of critical theory in the Frankfurt School tradition. One
of these challenges is the interdisciplinarity of research. Another challenge is the reflexive character
of  critical  theories  –  while  Habermas  and  Honneth  do  not  share  the  first  generation’s  radical
skepticism towards the idea of self-standing philosophical reflection, they share the intuition that
philosophy cannot be separated from social analysis. No matter how close Habermas and Honneth
come to contemporary liberal theorizing, this intuition keeps them from adopting the perspective of
“ideal  theory”.  Most  importantly,  however,  the  Frankfurt  School  tradition  views  philosophical
critical  theory  as  inextricably  bound  to  critical  social  analysis  of  capitalist  society.  It  is  a
fundamental belief of the first generation that capitalism is a form of society that achieves social
integration as a totality only by suppressing and obscuring social contradiction and that the central
task  of  philosophy  is  to  supply  conceptual  models  that  can  grasp  this  phenomenon.  Although
Habermas and Honneth do not endorse the conception of totality implicit in that view, the challenge
to  create  concepts  in  a  political  philosophy  that  adequately  capture  the  internal  tensions  and
contradictions of the capitalist mode of socialization is still at the core of their theoretical projects.
Habermas’s  Legitimation Crisis is one attempt to come to terms with this idea by taking up and
critically transforming insights from systems theory. Honneth’s Critique of Power argues that, even
when we accept  the  fact  of social  differentiation,  we also have to understand capitalist  market
integration according to a model that allows us to see how relations of power suppress or disarm
normative conflicts. 
One  way  (but  certainly  not  the  only  way)  to  approach  Habermas’s  and  Honneth’s  intellectual
trajectories is to see their theories as attempts to come to terms with this idea. This separates them
to some degree from other contemporary moral and political theorists. As I have tried to make clear,
Baynes and Zurn show that this separation does not preclude a dialogue and that the insights that
Habermas and Honneth draw from their social theorizing enable them to construct arguments that
liberals can engage with without having to buy into the framework of analysis of late capitalism.
From  this  perspective,  Habermas’s  discourse  ethics  is  more  interesting  than  his  concept  of
“systematically distorted communication” or his colonization thesis. Honneth’s concept of social
pathologies will similarly be only one particular item in the toolbox of an anthropologically inspired
critique of social systems that are problematic from the perspective of a “formal conception of the
good life”. From the perspective of the project of classic critical theory, however, these concepts lie
at the very core of their work, informing their more constructive approaches at every turn. 
I would like to illustrate this difference by looking at how Baynes’s and Zurn’s works deal
with two familiar systematic issues in Habermas and Honneth. 
In the case of Habermas, this concerns discourse ethics. Baynes defends Habermas against
various objections, among them the familiar argument that the principles generated by discourse
ethics  are  so  formal  that  they  lack  substantive  content.  To  answer  this  objection,  Baynes  first
deploys a “partners in crime” argument to the effect that the same objection can be made against
Scanlon (122). Second, and more importantly, he argues that substantive ideals of mutual respect
are  “mirrored  in  the  procedure  itself”  (121).  However,  the  way  these  ideals  play  out  under
conditions of modern pluralism leads to a situation where only very abstract moral principles can be
justified, and more and more questions are treated as questions of ethics (rather than morality). At
the same time, it is only under these modern conditions that the idea of moral justification can be
combined with the idea of individual autonomy, which equips the former with an “explosive and
unsettling force” (120). In other words, the norms of moral justification and moral principles have a
contextual dimension that leads to the seemingly paradoxical conclusion that the more demanding
our idea of moral justification becomes, the more actual discourses can only generate principles that
are highly abstract  (and thus in need of political  interpretation).  As a representation of the best
interpretation  of  Habermas’s  view,  this  is  very  convincing.  But  it  also  points  to  an  insight
concerning the possibility of substantive moral philosophy in modern, rationalized societies that can
only be properly understood if one treats  social  theory as relevant  to ethical  theory.  This is,  of
course, an insight that is not available to more traditional moral philosophers like Scanlon. In other
words, even when one discusses Habermas’s contributions to conventional moral and metaethical
theorizing,  the outcomes  of  that  discussion include  social-theoretic  insights  that  are  not readily
intelligible within these debates.
In the case of Honneth,  I  would like to illustrate  my point  by reference to the question
whether recognition theory can adequately deal with markets. To answer this question, Zurn argues,
we must examine whether recognition in the sense of “normative evaluation” is among the causal
factors that determine the distribution of economic resources by markets. Zurn reads Honneth as
wavering between a strong but unconvincing version of the claim (that all misdistribution can be
attributed to some specific pattern of misrecognition) and a weak but perhaps trivial version (“that,
at an abstract level, recognition must be counted as one of several different ineliminable variables
relevant to explaining market dynamics”, 141). Zurn argues that the strength of the weaker version
depends on a systematic theory of capitalism, which Honneth has not delivered thus far (153). This
is correct, but there is also a perhaps more radical interpretation of the market problem that raises
issues related to social theory in general. If it is both true that markets are embedded in normative
frameworks (134) and that market participants generally see themselves as merely self-interested
actors (135), it might be the case that markets effectively implement an ideal of recognition only so
long as participants systematically deny that their interaction is governed by norms of recognition.
This might be a conceptual point about market recognition that does not depend on a substantial
explanatory theory of capitalism. Against Honneth’s perhaps more modest intentions, we might read
his theory as allowing us to question the internal form of the recognition regime of the market
independently of empirical claims about the determinants of market outcomes (an interpretation that
continues to be available in Freedom’s Right).
Both books demonstrate that Habermas and Honneth can be read either as sociologically
informed contributors to the larger project of a liberal theory of justice and democracy or as more
skeptical analysts of deep, intrinsic contradictions in the project of liberal modernity. Zurn’s and
Baynes’s choice to address an audience that is more interested in the former perspective than the
latter is entirely legitimate and will (hopefully) contribute to our shared project of motivating many
students to engage more deeply with these thinkers. Once they do so, however, they will find that
Habermas’s discourse ethics and Honneth’s discussion of the market as a recognition order are only
two examples of theoretical moves that perhaps can only be fully appreciated once one takes a more
sociologically radical perspective.
